What happens if we lose? A note to the West

Thomas Friedman, a three-time Pulitzer Prize winner – that is, a ‘guru’ of journalism – is one of the ‘opinion leaders’ in the Democratic camp. Reading his latest New York Times piece, one can imagine reading the thoughts of Messer Sullivan, Kirby or Biden.

The main point is formulated verbatim: "If he [Putin] wins, the Russian people lose. But if he loses and his successor is disorder, the whole world loses."

The conclusion is obvious: Of course, it would be better if the ‘Russian people’ lost (no mention of the ‘Ukrainian people’, by the way) than the ‘whole world’. In other words, Mr Putin’s victory and the preservation of his regime are presented as the lesser evil; the alternative is disorder with a bunch of new uncontrolled regimes and parts of Russia’s nuclear arsenal in the hands of numerous ‘Prigozhins’ and ‘Kadyrovs’.

It is this fear that determines the limits to which the White House is willing to support us, and it seems that limit has been reached already. This is the best way of explaining all those ‘under-assistance’ twists and turns that may seem to us strange, illogical and inconsistent.

In fact, it is a very consistent policy, albeit immoral and short-sighted at the same time; and part of that policy is the chorus of journalists and Harvard ‘experts’ who are ‘disappointed’ with how slow our counteroffensive is.

The essence of the policy is simple: Yes, Putin mustn’t win; and no, we shouldn’t be let to win Russia because "the whole world loses".

And it seems that none of our well-thought-out rational arguments can break through this fear, because irrational fears are among the strongest human motivations.

As much as we’ve already spoken about common values, it didn't work. Similarly, we’ve explained that such a policy is not actually wise, not a ‘pragmatic calculation’ but a mere unwillingness and idleness of well-fed cowards that don’t want to leave their comfort zone – and that they will have to leave their comfort zone sooner or later; and that it is in the pragmatic interests of the United States to accelerate our undisputable and convincing victory and prepare in advance to take control of the processes in the event of inevitable perturbations in Russia.

We've said this all before; and they’ve been unwilling to listen.

Perhaps it’s time to paint for our allies the picture of a possible future where Prigozhin’s Russia would not seem the worst option.

It is worth explaining to our friend Mr Borrell – and he is a real friend who’s really doing his best – that he is not entirely right when he says that without Western arms supplies, we would "lose the war in a few days and turn into a new Belarus".

Yes, we would lose; but not in a few days – in many months. Hundreds of thousands would die, and another 15 to 20 million would join refugee camps in Europe. And then we would become not a ‘second Belarus’, but a ‘second Afghanistan’, with a bloody guerrilla war going on for years and even decades right next to the EU border, with all the ‘amenities’ for our neighbours.

It is worth telling our enemy Mr Orban that if his efforts to help Russia win suddenly proved successful and we lost the war as he predicts, the last order to our million-strong army, hardened in battles with the ‘second army in the world’, would be to retreat to neutral European countries with all weapons and equipment and intern there – and that it would go not through the countries that have helped us but through Hungary only.

And along the way, the army would be tasked with providing a humanitarian corridor for millions of civilian refugees to leave – also through Hungary.

After all, shouldn't the Hungarians know what it looks like to march thousands of kilometres through someone else's ‘forcedly hospitable’ land in search of the ‘promised land’? History sometimes takes paradoxical twists, which is something worth thinking about.

It is worth explaining to all these Harvard-Pulitzer ‘ex-perts’ that a Ukraine forced to ‘not win’; to negotiate a truce; and to remain partly occupied – such a Ukraine would certainly not be able to join NATO and the EU and would not be attractive to investors, making it not only our tragedy, but also their severe headache.

This undefeated and abandoned country, however poor, would invest all its resources in the war, including, whatever it takes, to have nuclear weapons, and it would have a pretty good chance of success. And if the CIA somehow managed to prevent this – well, then a ‘dirty bomb’ would be made in almost every Ukrainian basement, and there would be nothing anyone could do about it.

Without reparations and investment, we would also have to fight poverty by any means necessary, including becoming one of the world’s hubs for trading illegal arms or other goodies undesirable in ‘civilised’ countries; a shadow ‘money laundry’; etc.

So maybe it’s easier for the White House to hand us over to Russia than have problems with such a crippled, PTSD-struck country?

No, because there might be no country but there would be too many Ukrainians to be physically destroyed by the Russians.

The children of the fallen Ukrainian soldiers would grow up as refugees in European orphanages and would cherish hatred not only for the occupiers but also for those who betrayed us in the decisive moment.

And since it would be difficult for them to get to Moscow, their anger would be channelled into revenge against those who can be got: Western politicians who once contributed to our defeat.

All those horrific images should be put up to Messrs Friedmans, Sullivans, and Bidens, and become more real nightmares than a very abstract ‘disorder in Russia’.

And this should make them realise that the only way to avoid all those nightmares is a victorious Ukraine, which, with Western help, will have defeated Russian troops; liberated all its territories; joined NATO and the EU; and, in return, continued to be civil, controlled, respectful of the rules of the ‘club’, and considerate in how it treats allies and investors.