Russia starting to lose control in yet another group of countries
To say that Russia "controls" the processes in most of the countries of the African continent would be more like a fantasy. My colleagues and I analyzed the instruments of influence of the Russian Federation and came to the conclusion that there is a conditional "Russian zone", which includes only six countries. The rest are the sphere of future interests and the sphere of competition with other powers. Which include both regional leaders (Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa) and China. The latter, by the way, really significantly influences the policy of about half of the countries of Africa.
The question arises: "What then are the causes of the problems of Western countries in the African direction?" The answer lies in the specifics of the policy of building relations with African countries. EU and US investments were mainly concentrated around the extractive business and, for the most part, did not concern the areas of industrial development, technology transfer, or human capital. Humanitarian issues were resolved through international organizations, which masked the role of Western states.
And, finally, support for civil society was somehow connected with the issues of building a democratic (European-style) model of political system. All this allowed local political elites to declare the "neocolonial" nature of "Western politics". Especially in recent years, when a number of African states made a breakthrough in economic development and were in dire need of technological cooperation and investment.
This situation allowed China to play on contrasts. The PRC is primarily interested in resources. But the Chinese approach consisted in the localization of a number of industries (read technological cooperation), investments in energy and transport. We can also mention the so-called "stadium diplomacy" – the construction of sports, scientific and cultural facilities with their transfer "as a gift" to the country "from the Chinese people". Which allowed everyone to ask the rhetorical question "what have the Europeans built in recent years". And, finally, the issue of education – the number of African students in the PRC from 2012 to 2022 increased 8 times.
Moscow entered the news media, the political sphere (political technologists), the security sphere. Including unstable jurisdictions with, as a rule, authoritarian regimes. At the same time, actively developing the humanitarian and educational component. And, taking into account the media factor, it quite easily transformed a number of manifestations of anti-colonial sentiments into "anti-Western". But a number of Kremlin initiatives (such as, for example, the idea of building a nuclear power plant, entry through destabilization of the region, political technological assistance to counter-elites) began to conflict primarily with the interests of regional leaders (Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa), as well as with the interests of the PRC.
Instead, in November, two Western "heavyweights" visited the African continent at once. Moreover, the agenda of their meetings, the questions and the emphasis made contrasted significantly with the previous experience of European and American policy in Africa:
• US President Joe Biden is on a two-day visit to Angola, where he is also meeting with the leaders of Zambia, Congo, and Tanzania.
• French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot paid visits to Chad and Ethiopia.
• Nigerian President Bola Tinubu was in Paris on a visit.
It's probably worth starting with the outline of Joe Biden's visit. First (and this is important), the American president voiced the key theses regarding the results of the meetings at the slavery museum in the Angolan capital Luanda. Where he stated:
• Allocation of $1 billion in aid for families forced to leave their homes due to drought. An important point is that this is direct US aid on a large scale. And it is related to the topic of hunger and food security.
• Providing a $500 million loan for the construction of the Lobito Atlantic Railway, a project designed to connect the coast of Angola with the DRC and Zambia. At this stage, the loan was issued for the reconstruction of the existing branch through Angolan territory, and the start of construction of the branch to Zambia has been announced for 2026.
These two points alone, or rather the way they are presented, can be perceived as a counterplay on the field used by Russia:
1. The statements made at the slavery museum (as well as the meetings there) are a direct reference to "anti-colonial" sentiments on the African continent and the Russian Federation's attempts to "monopolize the topic."
2. Direct aid, and not through international organizations, also "interrupts" the Russian "food packages" that the "African Corps" advertises as a demonstration of the Kremlin's readiness to help the poor. The United States simply gives more. Here, their competitor is rather China. But Beijing is still "ahead" thanks to its "stadium diplomacy" – the construction of sports, cultural or scientific infrastructure facilities.
3. The large credit line and the development of railway infrastructure, at first glance, are an attempt to compete primarily with Chinese projects. Especially since, by and large, the railway is also being built "from the port to the mines". But Zambia and the DRC are countries to which Russia is also interested in entering – it is actively trying to deploy its infrastructure of influence there. A large project that will be "tied" to one of the few remaining American partners on the continent creates difficulties for the Kremlin.
And, finally, the process that began shortly before Biden's visit — investments in the technological transformation of the cellular (and Internet) provider Africell. This company is owned by the USA and operates in Angola, DRC, Gambia and Sierra Leone. An important process that maintains American presence (and possibly control) in the entire region's telecommunications industry.
The visit of the French foreign minister was more likely to be of an "emergency" nature – after the negative events in Niger, Chad, and Mali, it was necessary to find a foothold on the continent and propose an updated work format. France has established contacts with regional leaders, one of which is Ethiopia. The press wrote little about the "measurable" results of the visit in the economic sphere. Instead, two broad political gestures were made:
• France returned to Ethiopia more than 3,500 archaeological artifacts stored in French museums. In addition, Barrot brought three of them personally.
• The French Foreign Ministry announced its intention to lobby for African countries to secure two permanent (!) seats in the UN Security Council. It is easy to guess that one of these candidates is Ethiopia itself.
Negotiations also took place on issues of regional security (in particular, the problems of Sudan, Somalia) and the France-Africa forum, the final agreements were reached in September 2024. And here the role of regional leaders is important – if a number of countries can simply ignore the "French" summit for political reasons, then it will be much more difficult to refuse influential neighbors.
The weapon topic is a separate block that should be studied carefully. The fact is that for more than 20 years, Russia, in promoting its interests, has placed a bet on the supply of weapons and equipment. From 2023, the Russian Federation began to rapidly lose its share in the African market as the percentage of Russian weapons sold to the countries of the region fell from 44% (these are official, "white" supplies, according to some data the total is more than 55%) to 17-20% (for sub-Saharan Africa – less than 17%). In addition, competitors of the Russian Federation offer the local market more modern than old Soviet models, for example, Turkiye has become the main supplier of UAVs to Niger.
Thus, under the threat of the final loss of influence on the African continent, European and American politicians tried to transform their approaches. they are trying to play in traditional directions for Russia. And the activity of Turkiye (especially against the background of Syrian events) should not be discounted. Especially since in Libya, Ankara supports the government in Tripoli, and Moscow supports General Haftar.
Therefore, 2025 will be an eventful year on the African continent.
