Threats from Hungary and Slovakia won't affect fuel market supply. We receive up to 10% (at peak) from this direction, and we have the logistical capacity to bring at least 50% more. However, we have these capabilities thanks to a diversified supply system, which won't strengthen if we lose this direction.

Ukraine is a good client for MOL (which owns refineries in Hungary and Slovakia). Losing it would be shooting themselves in the foot. They understand this, judging by the cessation of talks about possibly stopping the electricity supply to us from Hungary. Because it's their considerable money. And when Russian oil stops flowing there (these sanctions exceptions aren't forever), such a client will be even more necessary for them. However as soon as we gain access to "big water," we'll be the first to refuse Hungarian-Slovak imports as quite expensive.

Currently, we have enough reasons to impose sanctions and explain their cause, and everyone would understand them both internally and externally. But we didn't warn Europe and remain silent now. Some sanctions were imposed against Lukoil (a Russian but private company), but not against Rosneft (a state company), which is also in that Druzhba pipeline. (There's also Tatneft, closer to the Kremlin than Lukoil. In particular, the defense industry is actively developing in Tatarstan, where they assemble "shaheds" [drones – ed.]).

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